Delayed Blockchain Protocols by Stone, Drew
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
06
83
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
8 A
pr
 20
18
DELAYED BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOLS
DREW STONE
Abstract. Given the parallels between game theory and consensus, it makes
sense to intelligently design blockchain or DAG protocols with an incentive-
compatible-first mentality. To that end, we propose a new blockchain or DAG
protocol enhancement based on delayed rewards. We devise a new method for
imposing slashing conditions on miner behavior, using their delayed rewards
as stake in a Proof of Work system. Using fraud proofs, we can slash malicious
miner behavior and reward long-lived, honest behavior.
1. Introduction
The hype around blockchains and DAGs (which we refer to interchangeably)
has outlived their ability to compete against centralized service providers. The
payment processors and money services businesses still scale more efficiently and
more cheaply versus their blockchain competitors. This, however, has not stopped
the rise in research around scalability and security-first designs. By building with
new scalable and secure consensus protocols, these networks stand to realize the
potential of decentralized cryptocurrencies. New designs, however, introduce new
attack vectors. They change up the incentive structure of the underlying game by
potentially reducing costs of attacks. With new scalable designs comes the hope
for new game theoretic techniques for dealing with uncertain consequences.
The parallels between game theory and consensus, as exhibited by the repeated
nature of mining for rewards, represent clear indicators in the usefulness of game
theoretic techniques towards protocol design. Using inspiration from Proof of Stake
protocols, especially slashing conditions, we develop a methodology for designing
similar incentive mechanisms over Proof of Work consensus algorithms.
2. Related Work
Consensus shares many properties as convergence to Nash equilibria in various
repeated games. Abraham et al. [1] introduced games that share similarities with
the standard consensus problem. We use this work as a motivation for these ideas.
In addition, there has been ample research into scalability and security-first
protocol designs. Sompolinsky and Zohar showcase the benefit of this approach in
[2, 3, 4] for different tree and DAG based topologies.
3. Background
3.1. Consensus Games. We will start with an example of a simple coordination
game that motivates the work of the paper, in that it should incentivize the same
response (consensus). We will extend this game to its infinite form and analyze the
existence of subgame perfect nash equilibria with discounted rewards.
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Example 3.1. Suppose that there are n > 1 players with action space Ai = {0, 1}.
• If everyone plays 0, then ∀i ∈ P , ui(a) = 1 where a = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
• If exactly two players i, j ∈ P play 1, then ui(a) = uj(a) = 2, uk(a) = 0
for k 6= i, j.
• Otherwise, ∀i ∈ P , ui(a) = 0.
From the game above, it is clear that the zero-vector is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. No player has a unilateral deviation to choose 1, since all players
including the deviating party will end up with a payoff of 0. However, two-players
who collude and form a deviating coalition have an incentive to choose 1. To that
end, we introduce the concept of resilient Nash equilibria.
Definition 3.2. Let G be a game. A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a k-
resilient Nash equilibrium of G, if for all coalitions C, |C| ≤ k, and all members
i ∈ C, the following condition is satisfied:
ui(σC , σ−C) ≥ ui(σ
′
C , σ−C)
i.e. coalitions of size at most k do not benefit from deviating [5].
In general, if players are rewarded α for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the
zero-vector strategy profile and exactly 2 players are rewarded with β for playing
otherwise as above with α < β, there will not exist k-resilient Nash equilibria for
values of k satisfying 2β
k
> α. From this simple example, we immediately see the
ease and possibility of disrupting consensus that colluding opens up in economically-
based, consensus games.
Now suppose we play this game infinitely many times. We would hope to devise
a strategy that, in the presence of a colluding coalition of size k satisfying 2β
k
> α,
is a k-resilient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Given that the one-shot game
is not k-resilient, can we devise a way to punish this coalition such that consensus
at 0 is incentive aligned? A common, elementary setup in game theory is to find
discount factors δ that incentivize a particular strategy. Although this is unrealistic
since players in the real world have arbitrary δ, this information provides insight
into the dynamics of the game. The strategy that every honest (non-colluding)
player will play is as follows:
• Play 0 if every other player played 0 in the previous round.
• Play 1 if a colluding party of size k deviates to 1 in the previous round for
t rounds.
The cooperation strategy is thus a dominant strategy, subgame perfect nash equi-
librium strategy for the discount factor δ satisfying:
α+ δ ∗ α+ δ2 ∗ α+ . . . ≥
2β
k
+ δt+1 ∗ α+ δt+2 ∗ α+ . . .
α
1− δ
≥
2β
k
+
δt+1α
1− δ
α
1− δ
−
δt+1α
1− δ
≥
2β
k
α
1− δ
(
1− δt+1
)
≥
2β
k
1− δt+1
1− δ
≥
2β
αk
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3.2. Blockchain Terminology. The important concepts to understand revolve
around cryptocurrencies, Proof of Work (PoW), and Proof of Stake (PoS) proto-
cols. Decentralized cryptocurrencies most importantly solve the double-spending
problem. This is the problem in which a single user manages to spend the same
cryptocurrency in multiple transactions, a la double spending cryptocurrencies.
Since this shouldn’t happen in any secure financial system, it remains one of the
more important attacks to prevent against.
A PoW system is one in which participants solve some computationally-hard but
tractable puzzle. For our purposes, we are interested in the hashing proof of work
used by cryptocurrency networks. Traditionally in these proof of work systems,
miners deploy massive amounts of computer systems to compete for rewards. Their
computational power provides an accurate distribution over their expected rewards
and their rewards are paid out without an intentional delay for incentive-compatible
reasons (Bitcoin does impose a delay but only for preventing stale/invalid block
rewards).
A PoS system is one in which participants stake the underlying blockchain’s
cryptocurrency to compete for rewards. Rewards should be paid out proportionally
to a miner’s stake. Within these protocols, new attack vectors are introduced
such as the ”Nothing at Stake” problem. Since participants use money instead
of computer power, they can stake their cryptocurrency on every fork/chain they
want, i.e. have nothing at stake for any given chain. To combat this behavior, we
impose slashing conditions on allowed behavior within a PoS system. When these
slashing conditions are satsified, miners lose portions or the entirety of their stake
and so are disincentivized to act a certain way.
4. Model
Using these concepts as foundations, the synopsis of our model is as follows.
A delayed blockchain protocol is one in which rewards are deterministically or
randomly delayed to provide a staking mechanism on future payouts. We focus
primarily on the notion of double-spending and its potential inclusion within an
active blockchain or DAG protocol. The delayed property enables this to be overlaid
onto any blockchain network, providing increased security through verifiable fraud
proofs. Broadcasting valid fraud proofs will result in a miner’s future rewards being
slashed and eliminated, potentially shared with the reporter.
Definition 4.1. A fraud proof is an unforgeable, cryptographic proof of misbe-
havior, submitted to the protocol that can be verified in polynomial time.
Given that double-spends are verifiably erroneous actions (existence of conflicting
transactions signed by the same private key), we can transform this into a punish-
able action. Miners should not attempt to double-spend nor serve users attempting
to; any indication signals malice.
We adopt the original model from Nakamoto in his seminal paper on Bitcoin
and that used by Sompolinsky and Zohar in their work on scalable cryptocurrency
protocols. There is a network of miners, represented by a graph G = (V,E) such
that each miner has some proportion pv of the aggregate power,
∑
v∈V pv = 1. We
will model block inter-arrival times exponentially and model global block arrivals
according to a Poisson process {N(t) | t ≥ 0} with rate λ. A miner v’s block
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creation rate is then pv ∗ λ. For simplicity, we sum the transaction fee and block
reward into a general reward α(t) for mining new blocks at time t. In addition, we
denote G
(t)
v = (V (t), E(t)) as the network view of miner v at time t.
Definition 4.2. Given a cryptocurrency network protocol with reward α(t) and a
graph G, a miner v can expect to have, at time t with p = (p1, . . . , p|V |) and with
cost function c
(t)
v (p), the utility function:
u(t)v (p) = (α
(t) ∗ pv ∗ λ− c
(t)
v )dt
Example 4.3. We begin with a discretized formulation of a delayed mining game.
At each discretized time length ∆ starting from 0, a miner is selected and rewarded
for mining a block. This miner v has a pv chance of mining a block each time
step. Using the equations defined previously, we can quantify this miner’s expected
payout at some future time by simply taking a sum over the elapsed time steps.
Upon mining a block, the reward is kept frozen for k time steps. This means
that if a miner v mines a block at time t, he will receive that reward at time
t+∆∗k. The motivation for this, as we briefly mentioned, is to ensure that miner’s
have stake in the protocol (in their future rewards). In the interval [t, t + ∆ ∗ k),
the miner should be properly incentivized not to behave maliciously if he hopes
to receive the reward. We can additionally force, as part of the protocol, two
additional conditions on participation and rewards to ensure honest behavior is
incentive compatible. While these may not be intuitive yet, they will make sense
later on.
Definition 4.4. A (k, d, γ)-delayed blockchain or DAG protocol with block and
transaction fee rewards α(·) is a protocol where rewards are timelocked for k rounds,
d aggregate proof of work is required up front separate from the underlying mining
process, and α(·) decays with exponential rate γ.
Note: (k, 0, 0)-delayed protocols mimic existing protocols — k = 100 for Bitcoin
and k = 0 for others.
The first two parameters are simple and easily understood as the length of de-
lay in future rewards (which can capture arbitrarily many future rewards) and the
startup cost to combat Sybil attacks, respectively. The third parameter, γ, incen-
tivies miners to ”stick around” and actively mine or face arbitrary rates of decay
in their future, discounted rewards.
Proposition 4.5. In a (k, d, γ)-delayed protocol with block and transaction fee
rewards α(·), timestep lengths ∆, and discount factor δ, it is expected that the
utility a miner v has at each round from time t is:
Ek,γ [u
((t,t+∆))
v ] = δ
k∆(α(t) ∗ e−γ∗∆∗k ∗ pv ∗ λ− c
(t)
v )
Note: We will want to find values of δ such that our enhanced protocol benefits from
greater security guarantees as indicated by the potential loss in payouts that come
from malicious behavior.
5. Delayed Blockchains
Recall that the goal of these changes is to provide increased security and incentive
compatibility to arbitrary protocol designs. We want to prevent against double-
spend attacks from large mining parties up to a majority. Currently, the state of
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the art in Proof of Work protocol design has no punishment capabilities by design.
Rewards are paid out more or less instantly; delays are not used to incentivize
honest behavior but as a check on stale blocks.
In blockchain networks, we also have access to a robust public/private key in-
frastructure. Actions by mining participants in the network are uniquely signed by
participants’ private keys. If we hope to punish malicious participants, we would
hope to ”blacklist”/punish their public identities (public keys) within the proto-
col. In the current iteration of public blockchains however, this suffers from the
following drawbacks.
5.1. Drawbacks of existing protocols.
(1) Creating new public/private key pairs or identities is trivial. Malicious
miners can continuously change to a newly generated identity.
(2) Payouts are instantaneous. Assuming a particular chain is not reverted,
large mining parties can withdraw funds immediately.
(3) Large parties do not have proportional ”skin in the game” or stake against
their mining power.
For the purpose of this paper, we address the three issues above. The usefulness of
a (k, d, γ)-delayed blockchain protocol allows us the ability to tune the severity of
the punishment to arbitrary strengths in order to combat the mitigation techniques
above. The intuition for each is as follows:
(1) If d >> 0, creating new public/private key pairs to behave maliciously with
old key pairs should be disincentivized. In addition, if γ grows exponentially
as a function of the number of times a past winning miner drops out of the
current miner set, past winners will lose substantial portions of their future
rewards. In many cases, γ will incentivize sticking around for sufficiently
large k such that d can be set to 0.
(2) Payouts are no longer instantaneous and miners cannot instantly withdraw
funds until they honestly cooperate with the protocol rules for a parame-
terized amount of time.
(3) Miners have stake in reporting malicious behavior and in behaving accord-
ing to the protocol.
6. Subgame Perfect Equilibria
As we showed in our toy example, there are lengths of time for which deviations
are not rational decisions. We operate strictly in a rational agent model and leave
notions of Byzantine or irrational behavior for future work. Towards similar re-
sults, we consider a double-spend deviation on a (k, d, γ)-delayed blockchain with
deviation payoff ǫ > 0. That is, an adversary can double-spend and receive an
arbitrarily large reward of ǫ. We would expect that a double-spend attempt should
only be a rational deviation if ǫ is greater than the aggregate payout of a miner’s
future rewards.
6.1. (k, 0, γ)-delayed . For simplicity we assume there is no cost to mining or Sybil
startup cost. We also assume that all miners have been playing for sufficiently long.
The expected payoff for a miner v with power pv and discount factor δ, who has
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honestly participated in the protocol for l >> k time steps is:
u(1:l)v (p) =
l∑
i=1
δk+i−1(α ∗ e−γ∗k ∗ pv ∗ λ)
If the payoff for double-spending is ǫ. Then the payoff for double spending after l
rounds in the infinitely repeated game can be represented by replacing the last k
expected payoffs with ǫ. This is because we assume another miner submits a fraud
proof and slashes the k most recent, expected payouts:
u(1:l−k)v (p) + ǫ+ u
(l:∞)
v (p)
Then it follows, a profitable attack would satisfy the following:
u(1:∞)v (p) ≤ u
(1:l−k)
v (p) + ǫ+ u
(l+1:∞)
v (p)
u(l−k+1:l)v (p) ≤ ǫ
l∑
i=l−k+1
δk+i−1(α ∗ e−γ∗k ∗ pv ∗ λ) ≤ ǫ
ǫ = O(k ∗ α ∗ δk ∗ e−γ∗k ∗ λ)
We arrive at the big-O form using a rudimentary simplification of the left-hand
sum. We know that δ ∈ (0, 1), therefore, for l >> k, δl < δk. Each term of the
left-hand sum has a δl
′
, l′ ≥ l and so is bounded by δk. The sum is taken over k
terms, so we add a factor of k in front. Additionally, since pv ∈ [0, 1], it follows
that its omission can only add to the growth of the right-hand term.
If ǫ = O(k ∗ δk ∗ e−γ∗k), then a double-spend attack should be a profitable
deviation; strict equality would indicate a guaranteed profit. Given we set d = 0,
there is no cost to getting punished and malicious miners can trivially jumpstart
mining on new public/private key pairs. Now, if we increase d > 0, the cost of the
double spend will increase. This, however, has no effect on the payoff of honest
participation. Therefore, for ǫ sufficiently large, the protocol designer can tune d
to push attack costs higher.
To analyze subgame perfect equilbria, we must reverse the inequality. We leave
the equations unsimplified and closed forms for future work. These bounds serve
to illustrate the various ways we can increase attack costs without altering honest
rewards.
6.2. (k, d, γ)-delayed . Now consider the case where d >> 0. For a given miner
v ∈ V with power fraction pv, we let r
d
v denote the random variable of the total
number of rounds (resp. time interval length) of the blockchain protocol that it
takes miner v to solve d proof of work. It follows that Ev,d[r
d
v ] < ∞, since proofs
of work for hashing live in a finite space.
Now, when an attacker v double-spends, their address is invalidated or ”black-
listed” by the protocol’s rules. In order to startup again, the attacker v generates a
clean public/private key pair and shifts pv to this new pair. The miner a must com-
plete d >> 0 proof of work before earning any rewards. Then it is only profitable
DELAYED BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOLS 7
to do so if the following is satisfied:
u(1:∞)v (p) ≤ u
(1:l−k)
v + ǫ + u
(l+rd
v
+1:∞)
v (p)
u
(l−k+1:l+rd
v
)
v ≤ ǫ
l+rd
v∑
i=l−k+1
δk+i−1(α ∗ e−γ∗k ∗ pv ∗ λ) ≤ ǫ
ǫ = O((k + rdv) ∗ α ∗ δ
k ∗ e−γ∗k ∗ λ)
With this, we only increase the cost of a successful double-spend attack. Since
honest, long-lived miners are rewarded with only needing to solve the startup proof
of work once, they benefit in the long run. The right balance between tuning these
parameters would be an assignment that reaches a balance between the value of
future discounted rewards and the cost of successfully executing a double-spend
attack.
7. γ selection
Using γ as intended would require protocol upgrades. If at any time t, we have
a view of all miners or stakers by a list of public/private key identities pks(t) =⊕
v∈V (t) pkv, then as long as the winner v
∗ at time t continues to actively mine for
∆ ∗ k more time steps, they can expect their future reward to decay more slowly or
not at all compared to the event that they stop any time before the delayed interval
has passed.
More generally, γ could be parameterized to the frequency of participation of
a particular miner. Newly generated addresses will experience fast decay in their
future rewards compared to incumbent, ”reputable” addresses. Short-lived miners
can be penalized for their undesirable behavior, while long-lived nodes can be in-
centivized through proper γ selection. In any of these distributed systems, we want
to incentivize long-lived participation and truthful participation. Imposing restric-
tions on the behavior the protocol designer desires allows the designer control of
the underlying protocol’s incentives.
8. Implementation
Without detailing exactly how these ideas can be implemented, we offer a variety
of high-level techniques. For a (k, d, γ)-delay implementation, we can extend the
mining protocol to include timelocked transactions for winners of the mining game,
parameterized by a length k. The underlying protocol can maintain a set pks(t) at
each time t and track a variety of information about all miners it has seen in the past
(miners can reach consensus on this dataset as well) for γ funtionality. Additionally,
a double proof of work layer can be added to the traditional mechanics to include
functionality of the startup cost, d, parameter.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a new technique for improving the security of any
Proof of Work blockchain/DAG protocol. The main technique involves delaying
the rewards of miners to create a Proof of Stake style staking mechanism. We
impose slashing conditions around fraud proofs that can be determined by protocol
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designers. By slashing future rewards, we simulate slashing a miner’s stake in the
system.
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